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Do Minnesota Child Support Guidelines
"Support" Children?
Wanda Johnson*
Although the dominant culture continues to look to the two-
parent nuclear family as the theoretical ideal, policymakers can no
longer neglect the growing number of children who must rely ex-
clusively on their mothers for support. Our traditional system of
family law has shown undue concern for fathers by permitting ab-
sentee parents to avoid any meaningful child support. Instead it
has shifted the economic burden to custodial parents and taxpay-
ers.1 As a result, children living in single-parent families suffer
daily from economic deprivation.2 Widespread dissatisfaction with
the system has resulted in a series of legislative proposals to in-
crease the amount and improve enforcement of individual child
support orders.
A central theme in these reform efforts has been the passage
of child support guidelines which limit judicial discretion in setting
award amounts. In 1983, Minnesota joined twelve other states by
enacting its own Child Support Guidelines Statute.3 This note ana-
lyzes Minnesota's initial experience with support guidelines and
provides assistance for future reform.
State support guidelines have become increasingly important
since Congress passed the Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984. 4 Those amendments make the trend toward guide-
* Wanda Rowan Johnson is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota.
Ms. Johnson, the mother of three children herself, advocates changing the legal
system to safeguard more adequately the interests of all children. The author
gratefully acknowledges the vital contributions made by editor Robert Lazear and
expresses deep appreciation for his shared commitment to this article.
1. Judith Cassetty, Emerging Issues in Child-Support Policy and Practice, in
The Parental Child-Support Obligation 3 (Judith Cassetty ed. 1983).
2. Gladys Kessler, Crisis in Child Support, Trial, Dec. 1984, at 29.
3. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1982 & Supp. 1983), amended by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.551(5) (1984).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.
& 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1985)). The Child Support Enforcement Amendments
of 1984 became law on Aug. 16, 1984. H.R. 4325, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Under
the statutes each state is to develop child support guidelines by October 1, 1987.
The guidelines may be established by statute or through judicial or administrative
channels. 42 U.S.C.A. § 667(a) (West Supp. 1985). Although the guidelines need
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lines a national objective by requiring states to adopt child support
guidelines in order to remain eligible for federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) funds. Although guidelines re-
flect many legislatures' belief that all children should receive a ba-
sic minimum of support, they fail to reflect circumstances that
may entitle the child to a higher award. Therefore, use of guide-
lines may deprive children of fair support unless judges also con-
sider the specific relevant circumstances of each case. Limiting
judicial discretion in setting support awards may be appropriate
and adequate as afloor principle, but not as a ceiling.
Part I of this note considers the problem of inadequate child
support. Part II discusses the general principles courts use to de-
termine support awards. Part III examines Minnesota's Child Sup-
port Guidelines Statute, and finally, Part IV suggests further
reforms to protect children's right to adequate support.
I. The Problem
Studies portray a child support system which has failed its es-
sential purpose. Census Bureau statistics show that one of every
five children in the United States is potentially eligible for finan-
cial support from an absent parent,5 but that many absent parents
do not provide support. More than half of the eligible children
were not supported in any measure by their absent parents (only
fifty-nine percent of those eligible were awarded any support, and
of those awarded support only forty-nine percent received the full
amount, while twenty-eight percent received nothing). 6
Nationwide statistics relating to custody of more than ten
million children showed that seventy-five percent of divorced or
separated mothers received no child support at all. Almost all of
these mothers (ninety-seven percent) received less than the $250
per month estimated average cost of raising a child in a family
with $1,000 per month income. 7 Most alarming is the statistic that
not be binding, they must be made available to all judges and officials who deter-
mine support amounts. 42 U.S.C.A. § 667(b) (West Supp. 1985).
5. Irwin Garfinkel, David Betson, Thomas Corbett & Sherwood Zink, A Propo-
sal For Comprehensive Reform of the Child-Support System in Wisconsin [herein-
after cited as Wisconsin Reform], in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra
note 1, at 263.
6. Id.
7. Sanford Katz, A Historical Perspective on Child-Support Laws in the United
States, in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 17, 20. One may
reconcile seeming disparity between statistics from this study (75% of the mothers
received no support) and the Census Bureau's (57% of the children received no sup-
port) by considering the likelihood that mothers with only one child do not receive
awards or payments as frequently as mothers with two or more children in their
custody. This may be because mothers of only one child are more able to assume
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between 1978 and 1983, in real dollar terms, child support pay-
ments decreased by fifteen percent.8
Minnesota children also suffer the consequences of inade-
quate or nonexistent child support.9 Statistics from a 1980 Minne-
sota study show that single-parent families headed by women with
at least one child under six are most severely burdened-half of
these families live in poverty.' 0 Despite low average child support
awards, the payments nonetheless constitute a significant part of
family income for many custodial parents." These parents and
children directly suffer the contequences of inadequate or
nonsupport.
Minority children suffer most of all.12 More than two-thirds
of Black and Hispanic households headed by women fall below the
poverty line.13 The median income of minority families is consid-
erably lower than the median income of white families. Regard-
less of their previous economic circumstances, mothers and
children are usually poorer after divorce. 14
Mothers and fathers have an equal legal duty to support their
children.'5 The language of most child support statutes is gender
neutral. When the parents do not live together as a family, how-
ever, these laws apply almost universally to women as obligees and
men as obligors. Few children (about ten percent) live with their
total responsibility for child support or that courts hesitate to burden fathers with
child support when a child is born out of wedlock or both.
8. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Ser. P-23, No. 141, Child
Support and Alimony: 1983 at 2 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Census Bureau].
9. Nancy Jones, Equity and the Child Support Guidelines: Irreconcilably In-
consistent?, 2 Minn. Fain. L.J. 22, 23 (1984).
10. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Hubert H. Humphrey Inst. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of
Minn., A Statistical Look At The Economic Status of Women In Minnesota And
The United States (March 1983)).
11. Annemette Sorenson & Maurice MacDonald, An Analysis of Child-Support
Transfers, in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 35, 44.
12. When race is taken into account material conditions are exacerbated. While
minority children share the burdens of poverty with other children of divorced
families, these children suffer from the additional burdens of race and class dis-
crimination. Minority status women who support families retain the highest rates
of poverty. According to current population reports, 67% of white women but only
34% of Black and 41% of Hispanic women had been awarded child support pay-
ments as of 1984. Census Bureau, supra note 8, at 2.
13. Kessler, supra note 2, at 30.
14. U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, A Growing Crisis: Disadvantaged Women and
Their Children 11-14 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights].
15. Lucy Yee, What Really Happens in Child-Support Cases: An Empirical
Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver
District Court, 57 Den. L.J. 21, 25 (1979). Minn. Stat. § 518.17(4) (1984) states: "The
court may order either or both parents" to pay support.
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fathers following divorce.16 Moreover, courts order only a small
percentage of these children's mothers to pay support.17 For that
reason, this article refers to custodial parents as women or
mothers and to noncustodial parents as men or fathers.
The child support problem contributes to the "feminization of
poverty."' 8 Commentators describe this as "a new phrase for an
old problem: the large majority of poor people are women and
children."19 Increasing divorce rates and inadequate child support
systems transfer the bulk of family care expenses to women. This
process exacerbates broader economic discrimination against wo-
men reflected in the 59o that women earn for every $1.00 that men
earn 20 and forces increasingly disproportionate numbers of
mothers and children into the poverty class every year.2 ' Alarmed
by the rapidly accelerating rate of impoverishment, the National
Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity predicts that if the
current trend continues, women and children will make up nearly
all of the poor in the United States by the year 2000.22
Not all concern over the child support problem focuses on the
consequences for children and their parents. Efforts to reduce
welfare costs generate much of the concern over inadequate child
16. Nan Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of
Costs on Women, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 2 (1983).
17. In a 1981 Minnesota study researchers were startled to discover only one
case out of 104 in which a mother was ordered to pay support although the father
was awarded custody in a number of cases. Stephen Aldrich & Jean Klein Orsello,
Support and Maintenance Awards in Three Minnesota Counties, 1 Minn. Farn. L.J.
35, 37 (1982).
18. Diana Pearce & Harriet McAdoo, Nat'l Advisory Council on Economic Op-
portunity, Women and Children: Alone and In Poverty (1981) (citing Diana Pearce,
The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, Urb. & Social Change
Rev., Feb. 1978).
19. Proposed 1983 Legislative Positions, Minn. Women Law. Newsletter, Nov.
1983, at i, viii. See also Pearce & McAdoo, supra note 18. Some commentators criti-
cize this concept. Feminist author and professor Angela Davis argues that Black,
Chicana and Indian women have long experienced poverty. Davis asserts that wo-
men and poverty did not become a valid issue until it began to affect white, middle-
class women, typically white women who fall into poverty as a result of divorce.
Address by Angela Davis, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women (Nov. 15, 1984);
See also Ferraro Didn't Help Nonwhite Women, Angela Davis Says, Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Nov. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
20. Hunter, supra note 16, at 21. Statistics show an earnings disadvantage for
all women compared to men. Black and Hispanic women are even more disadvan-
taged. Hispanic women earn only half and Black women only 54% of the median
income of white men. Civil Rights, supra note 14, at 23.
21. Civil Rights, supra note 14, at 14. Nearly three million women with chil-
dren from an absent father had incomes below the poverty level in 1983. Census
Bureau, supra note 8, at 1, 2.
22. Kessler, supra note 2, at 30 (citing National Advisory Council on Economic
Opportunity, Critical Choices for the 80's 19 (1980)).
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support payments.23 Minnesota's 1983 Child Support Guidelines
statute24 stemmed from this major concern. The guidelines as
originally introduced applied only if the children of divorcing par-
ties received public assistance. State Senator Linda Berglin, a
principal author of the bill, maintains that a Minnesota county
precipitated the change from voluntary to mandatory public assist-
ance guidelines when the county stopped following the guidelines
in AFDC cases and ordered lower support payments instead. Pub-
lic assistance rolls, therefore, increased.25 To avoid this result, the
statute as finally enacted mandated use of the guidelines. In addi-
tion, the enacted guidelines applied to all dissolution cases, thereby
extending the inherent fairness of the floor principle to all awards
and preventing fathers whose children received AFDC from chal-
lenging the statute on equal protection grounds.26
Traditional judicial discretion in setting child support
amounts produces inconsistent awards;27 as a result of such ex-
treme inconsistencies, both the parties involved and the general
public perceive the system as arbitrary, irrational, and unfair.
28
Some observers feel that the system allows judges to exercise a
pro-male bias against enforcing an absent father's responsibility.
Moreover, many officials are simply bored with child support
cases.29 Consequently, judges and referees do not adequately con-
sider the child's needs when they determine the support amount. 30
A Denver study demonstrated the relative insignificance
which some judges assign to child support. Two-thirds of the fa-
thers in the study were ordered to pay less child support per
month than their car payments.3 ' The wide variations among indi-
vidual awards in the study portray the lack of an objective stan-
dard even more pointedly. For instance, no factor explained why
the same judge ordered one father to pay $120 of his $450 net
monthly income to support his two children, and yet ordered an-
other father to pay only $50 of his $900 net monthly income to sup-
port his two children. For many persons, such obvious
23. Cassetty, supra note 1, at 3.
24. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1984).
25. Cathy Gorlin, New Legislation Makes Major Changes In Child Support Obli-
gations, Minn. Trial Law., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 6.
26. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
27. Harry Krause, Child Support in America: The Legal Perspective 15 (1981).
28. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1.
29. Harry Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 17 Faro. L.Q. 109, 111 (1983).
30. Yee, supra note 15, at 21, 50.
31. Id. at 36. The court ordered one father in this study with a $250/month car
payment to pay $80/month child support. Another, with $1,000/month income and




inconsistencies in the award process discredit the entire child sup-
port system.
Inconsistent orders generate noncompliance as well as disre-
spect for the system.32 Until recently the system depended largely
on voluntary compliance to enforce child support awards. Conse-
quently, it provided little real support to mothers and children.
Three major procedural deficiencies in the system provide incen-
tives for fathers not to pay. First, courts do not keep payment
records-they consider that to be the mother's duty. Even if the
court keeps records, nonpayment triggers no enforcement mecha-
nism. Second, judges often exercise discretion to forgive arrear-
ages if the father promises to pay regularly in the future (or even
if he just has an "excuse"). Substantial judgments are not avail-
able to encourage fathers to keep their payments current. Third,
enforcement through adversary proceedings takes time and
money. Crowded court dockets and legal costs inhibit mothers
from asserting their right to payments.33
Inequities in child support originate in the awards process
and ineffective enforcement sustains, and even intensifies, the in-
justice. As a result, fathers' failure to make legally mandated
child support payments constitutes "one of the most massive in-
stances of lawlessness in this country."34
New enforcement legislation is designed to remedy this situa-
tion. The 1984 federal legislation 35 provides several financial in-
centives for states to encourage child support payments.3 6 For
example, the law requires states to expand remedies available to
enforce child support awards. One remedy, available to both wel-
fare and nonwelfare families, is mandatory income withholding
when an absent parent is one month behind in child support pay-
ments.37 Hennepin County, Minnesota hired eighteen additional
employees to provide these collection services. Under the new
32. Judith Cassetty addresses the noncompliance issue with this observation:
"One cannot help but wonder what our record of voluntary compliance with in-
come-tax laws would look like if tax liability were established on a case-by-case ba-
sis, as is the child-support obligation." Cassetty, supra note 1, at 6.
33. Hunter, supra note 16, at 13-14.
34. Isabel Marcus, The Sexual Politics of Current Child Support, in The Paren-
tal Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 29, 33.
35. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.
& 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1985)).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 655, 658(a) (West Supp. 1985). Financial incentives include
federal matching of administrative costs, 90% matching for automated management
systems used in income withholding and other required procedures, as well as re-
wards based on the amount collected in non-AFDC cases by an efficient, cost-effec-
tive state system.
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
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Act, the federal government will reimburse Hennepin County for
seventy percent of the cost.38 Another mandatory provision im-
poses a lien on the obligor's property in the amount of unpaid
child support.3 9 Minnesota statutes largely conform to these re-
quirements.40 While children benefit directly from withholding
provisions, lien provisions largely benefit the obligee.4 1 Income
withholding increases the likelihood of timely support payments,
whereas lien provisions are not readily convertible into cash.
These laws, however, strongly indicate a change in public policy to-
ward enforcement-noncompliance is no longer acceptable.42
II. General Principles
Child support law stems from the general moral principle
that obliges parents to share their resources with their children,
even if it means a sacrifice in their own standard of living.43 So
long as the family shares a single household, that sharing is pre-
sumed natural-unavoidable. 44 But the trend toward short-term
marriage4 5 has made the general rule much more difficult to ap-
ply. When a father does not live with his child, the question of
how to calculate the amount to be "shared" inevitably arises.
Physical separation requires a conscious act to share income. 46
Although the traditional rule imposed a moral duty to act without
adequate legal remedy, this duty evolved into an equitable
doctrine.47
No general agreement exists as to what should be the goals
and purposes of child support. Thus, legal scholars advance com-
peting theories of the fairest way to determine support awards.
Serious social and political considerations are at issue in develop-
ing any child support formula. Protecting the child's interest is
the ostensible goal of all child support law, yet other interests also
come into play. An equitable allocation of the support burden be-
38. Joe Kimball, County Hiring 18 Workers to Help Collect Child-support Pay-
ments, Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July 3, 1984, at B4, col. 1.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
40. Minn. Stat. § 518.611(3) (1984) provides for income withholding. Minn. Stat.
§§ 548.09(1), 548.091(2) (1984) contain lien provisions.
41. The custodial parent who has been able to compensate for the unpaid sup-
port will be repaid. The child who has been deprived of parental support is without
remedy.
42. H. Robert Hahlo, Child Support: A Global View, in The Parental Child-Sup-
port Obligation, supra note 1, at 195.
43. Id.
44. Wisconsin Reform, supra note 5, at 263.
45. Hahlo, supra note 42, at 204.
46. Wisconsin Reform, supra note 5, at 263.
47. Hunter, supra note 16, at 3.
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tween the parents serves the child's best interests, as well as
brings a standard of "basic fairness" to the child support system.
Such a standard is necessary to the political success of any govern-
ment intervention program. Political success also depends on so-
cial acceptability of the method used to determine support. In
their endeavors to achieve fairness and general acceptance, courts
and legislatures have utilized two basic approaches: the cost-shar-
ing approach and the resource-sharing approach. Neither ap-
proach is adequate alone.
The cost-sharing approach is the more popular of the two ap-
proaches.48 This approach first assumes that parents are equally
responsible for their children; second, it assumes that courts can
objectively determine the cost of supporting a child; and finally, it
mandates equal apportionment of that cost between the parents.
To implement a cost-sharing approach a court must define
the "cost" of raising a child. Under one method, courts define cost
as the basic necessities needed to meet minimum welfare stan-
dards. Other cost-sharing methods consider the family's relative
standard of living but disagree about whether the cost should re-
late to the mother's or father's standard of living or some median
standard. Some systems do not consider the relative cost of sup-
port because no reliable measure is available.49 Economist Allan
King disputes that claim and points to government data resources
and state wrongful death statutes which set out methods of deter-
mining levels of personal consumption for family members.5 0
In any case, support awards based solely on dividing child
raising costs usually result in the mother/child household living at
a lower standard than the father's household and a relative in-
crease in the father's disposable income. The disparity between
households increases as the father's income rises.51 This inequity
occurs because splitting costs evenly between parents with widely
disparate incomes places a heavier proportion of the burden on the
mother. She is almost certainly the poorer parent, and thus, the
award forces her to devote a larger portion of her income for child
support. She may have little remaining for her own support, caus-
ing the entire mother/child household to live in poverty.
By contrast, the resource-sharing approach posits that the
child is the "innocent party" in divorce, and therefore, child sup-
port should provide the custodial household with the same stan-
48. Cassetty, supra note 1, at 5.
49. Barbara Bergmann, Setting Appropriate Levels Of Child-Support Payments,
in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 115.
50. Allan King, Economists in Marital Contests, Trial, Mar. 1984, at 46, 47.
51. Hunter, supra note 16, at 10, 20.
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dard of living which the child would have enjoyed if her parents
had remained together.52 This approach recognizes, as social scien-
tists suggest, that children of divorced parents are no more likely
than other children to experience school or social problems pro-
vided that their economic status does not suffer. Maintaining the
child's previous standard of living after divorce is not only in the
child's best interest, but benefits society in general.53
Despite the advantages of the resource-sharing approach,
courts seldom issue orders based on a pure version of the ap-
proach. The courts reason that some modification of the formula
is necessary to protect the father's income. It is impossible to pro-
vide the child with a higher standard of living than her mother
when they share the same household5 4 The two households that
result from divorce necessarily generate more expense than the
previous single household.55 Awards assuring that the child's stan-
dard of living does not decline will allocate the entire burden of
the family's increased expenses to the father.
In a comparison study of various systems, a method based on
the resource-sharing approach produced the highest awards. In
the first step of this method, the court computes the expenses of
maintaining an additional household after divorce. Each new
household's prior standard of living is then reduced by the same
percentage to accommodate the extra expense. Each adult and
each child suffers approximately the same level of downward read-
justment, presuming that neither household can afford its previous
lifestyle.5 6
Another modified resource-sharing system stresses uniform-
ity. Under this system, all fathers with similar incomes and num-
bers of children to support pay the same amount of support.57
This method is easy to apply. To determine awards, court officials
simply multiply the father's income by the percentage indicated in
a table (similar to the Minnesota Guidelines) using only two fac-
tors, the father's income and number of children. Emphasizing
uniformity alone, however, elevates procedural efficiency above
substantive fairness. Mothers and children whose inadequate
awards have pushed them to the brink of poverty find no comfort
in knowing that the amount is uniform among fathers. The most
52. Sorenson & MacDonald, supra note 11, at 36.
53. Cassetty, supra note 1, at 4.
54. Isabel Sawhill, Developing Normative Standards for Child-Support Pay-
ments, in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 79, 82.
55. King, supra note 50, at 47.
56. Hunter, supra note 16, at 12.
57. Sorenson & MacDonald, supra note 11, at 36.
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equitable system--equitable for each parent and for the child-
combines the cost-sharing and income-sharing approaches.
Although equalizing costs of child raising between men and
women is equitable, it does not resolve the support problems of
parents who lack enough resources to divide.58 The support prob-
lem is more complex when the father acquires a second family.
Although legal theory holds that assumption of additional parental
obligations does not justify a reduction to an existing child support
decree, the "first-family-first" theory and actual practice often di-
verge.5 9 As a result, the single parent households which replace
the traditional nuclear family require more help from government
sources if the household is to live above the poverty level.60 Re-
form must address these issues.
With few exceptions, child support law concludes that the
child's right to share the resources of both parents is superior to
the right of parents to retain them.61 Awards are set, however, in
an adversarial hearing where the child's interests are not directly
represented. In the context of a power structure in which adults
control children and men control women, outcomes frequently
favor fathers over mothers and children.62
In a Denver study, the highest awards resulted when the fa-
ther dealt alone with the district attorney. Lower amounts were
products of the full interaction of judge, district attorney, the fa-
ther, and his attorney.63 These results challenge the notion that
the adversary process is in the child's best interest. Adjudicated
amounts also affect negotiated settlements. Stipulated awards re-
flect judicial policy in the jurisdiction, for they depend on the
amount which each party's attorney predicts that the judge would
award.64 Enforcement and modification of awards, which require
an adversarial proceeding, bring the same power structure into
58. Hunter, supra note 16, at 15.
59. Carol Bruch, Developing Normative Standards for Ciild-Support Payments:
A Critique of Current Practice, in The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra
note 1, at 119, 126.
60. Glenn Collins, Need Seen for Government to Offer Families More Help,
Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Oct. 28, 1984, at F16, col. 1.
61. Cassetty, supra note 1, at 7. The Minnesota Supreme Court expressed this
attitude in Mund v. Mund, 252 Minn. 442, 445-46, 90 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1958) (parents
may not, even by court adopted stipulation, absolve themselves of the obligation to
support their offspring) and in Quist v. Quist, 207 Minn. 257, 260, 290 N.W. 561, 563
(1940) (the obligation to support the issue of the marriage is exactly the same after
the divorce as it was before the dissolution of the marriage).
62. Cassetty, supra note 1, at 7.
63. Yee, supra note 15, at 49.
64. Hunter, supra note 16, at 6 n.31.
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play. The result is a pattern of "set" awards subject to voluntary
compliance.
Another purpose of child support is social control. Through
economic rewards and -penalties, the system enforces a specific
form of social organization-the traditional male-headed nuclear
family. Society uses the system to punish the parent it considers
responsible for the divorce and to reward intact families.65 Arbi-
trary and inconsistent support awards create the threat necessary
to sustain this control. Fathers threatened with extremely high
child support awards are constrained from leaving the family lest
they "pay dearly for their action." Mothers, on the other hand,
fear that both they and their children will "pay" for divorce
through low child support awards. Faced with these threats, both
parents frequently prefer the support arrangement during mar-
riage to the unknown risks of court-awarded child support. Thus,
they remain married, perpetuating gender stereotypes whereby
males maintain power over females by dispensing the money.6
In practice, child support awards rarely attain any of the pur-
ported goals which justify them. Current systems do not meet the
child's minimal needs. They do not insure that the child will
either retain the standard of living she enjoyed during the mar-
riage or share the standard of living of her parents after divorce.6 7
Nevertheless, the essential purpose of support statutes continues
to be the establishment of an "effective method [of child support]
that is paramountly concerned with the protection of children's in-
terests."68 The present system's failure to carry out this intent has
forced lawmakers to develop new guidelines to insure that support
awards are in the best interests of the child.
III. Minnesota Child Support Law
Minnesota's child support problems parallel the national di-
lemma.69 Historically, Minnesota judges had unfettered discretion
65. Conservative theorist George Gilder advocates authoritarian family relation-
ships, recommending deliberately lower salaries for women, as well as government
allowances for intact families. Hunter, supra note 16, at 23.
66. Marcus, supra note 34, at 32.
67. Support orders are typically less than half the amount necessary to provide
a child with even a low-cost standard of living. Bruch, supra note 59, at 119.
68. Katz, supra note 7, at 25. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this
importance by referring to the "basic right of minor children to support by the par-
ents" and refusing to be bound by a parental agreement because courts "will be
controlled by the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration" in Tammen
v. Tammen, 289 Minn. 28, 30, 182 N.W.2d 840, 842 (1970).
69. See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text.
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to determine the amount of support awards.70 In 1951, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that "[flixing ... the amount to be paid
as support for minor children rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court. Ordinarily, we will not disturb such award unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion."71 Beginning in 1969, however,
state legislation commanded Minnesota courts to consider specific
relevant factors in setting awards.72 The 1983 and 1984 state legis-
latures created methods of computing and enforcing child support
awards. The legislatures intended all of the changes to increase
uniformity by limiting judicial discretion.
It is clear that each reform did not affect the system as the
legislature intended. While concern over the growing child sup-
port problem prompted these changes, it is not apparent that the
changes serve the children's best interests. For the most part, the
changes address equitable distribution of the child support burden
and are insufficient to accomplish the legislature's goals. Confu-
sion surrounding application of the statutes continues the pattern
of inequitably low awards and dilutes their potential benefit to
children. In order to meet the children's needs effectively, the sys-
tem requires further revision.
A. Child Support Guidelines
The most significant change in child support law was the en-
actment of the Minnesota Guidelines Statute.73 The statute estab-
lished the child support guidelines presented in the table below:
70. Minnesota statutes prior to 1969 did not contain any specific criteria for the
judiciary to consider when determining support.
71. Krusemark v. Krusemark, 232 Minn. 416, 418, 46 N.W.2d 647, 649 (1951) (cit-
ing three previous decisions). In 1957, the Minnesota Supreme Court again de-
ferred to the trial court's award of support under a decree of divorce. Johnson v.
Johnson, 250 Minn. 282, 84 N.W.2d 249 (1957).
72. The legislature has added specific relevant criteria through the years. The
current statute lists five relevant factors which judges must consider in determin-
ing support. The relevant factors cited in the statute include:
(a) the financial resources and needs of the child;
(b) the financial resources and needs of the custodial parent;
(c) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational
needs; and
(e) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17(4) (1984).
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Guidelines for support for an obligor with a monthly in-
come of $6001 or more shall be the same dollar amounts as
provided for in the guidelines for an obligor with a monthly in-
come of $6000.
The guidelines determine a father's monthly support obliga-
tion by matching his monthly net income with the number of chil-
dren he supports. As his income increases, the percentage of
income designated for child support increases to reflect the obli-
gor's superior ability to pay. As the number of dependent children
increases, the percentage of income further increases to reflect the
greater cost of support.
1. Deviating from the guidelines.
The legislature originally intended the Guidelines Statute to
apply only in public assistance cases,75 but amended it in commit-
tee to apply to all obligors as a standard for awards.7 6 The statute
mandates consideration of the guidelines in each child support
case, yet provides that the court may exceed or modify the guide-
lines by considering evidence relative to the specific criteria set out
74. Id.





Interpretations of the statutory requirements for deviating
from the guidelines differ. If an order deviates below the guide-
lines, the requirements are clear. Both the Guidelines Statute and
the Minnesota Child Support Statute78 require "express findings
of fact" to explain the departure.79 Requirements are not as clear
for departures above the guidelines which are specifically ad-
dressed only in the Guidelines Statute. The court may increase
the award "without making express findings by agreement of the
parties or by making further findings."8 0
By incorporating the guidelinqs into the Child Support Stat-
ute, the legislature intended to extend the statutory minimum pro-
visions to all awards. State Senators Linda Berglin and Ronald
Sieloff recall that this was the legislators' primary reason for
amending the bill.81 Two statutory provisions also support this
conclusion: 1) the previous Child Support Statute remains in force
and instructs courts to consider certain criteria when they deter-
mine awards;8 2 and 2) the incorporating statute sets out require-
ments only for orders below the guidelines.8 3
When the Guidelines Statute went into effect, legal commen-
tators agreed that upward deviations in non-public assistance cases
did not require additional findings.8 4 The only difference of opin-
ion concerned whether the statute required express findings for
upward departures in public assistance cases.8 5 Several Minnesota
Court of Appeals decisions, however, hold that any upward depar-
ture requires express findings.
In Johnson v. Johnson ,86 a non-public assistance case, the
77. See Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5)(e) (1984).
78. Minn. Stat. § 518.17(4), (5) (1984).
79. Id.; Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1984).
80. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1984).
81. Interviews with State Senators Linda Berglin and Ronald Sieloff, members
of the legislature when the guidelines were enacted, confirm that the "floor" was to
extend to all awards. Another reason was to withstand any possible equal protec-
tion argument which fathers whose children were AFDC recipients might make if
the statute applied only to those awards which involved public assistance. See infra
note 93.
82. Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (1984).
83. Id. § 518.17(5).
84. Jean Gerval, 1983 Changes in Family Law, Bench & Bar, Oct. 1983, at 9. See
also Gorlin, supra note 25, at 24; Cathy Gorlin, 1983 Legislature Enacts New Family
Laws, Hennepin Law., July-Aug. 1983, at 13.
85. Compare Gerval, supra note 84, at 9 ("In public assistance cases the court
may only deviate above or below the guidelines if the court makes express findings
of fact .... ) with Nancy Livingston, Child Support Payments Now Easier to Com-
pute, St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 2 ("If judges or referees deviate
downward... they have to explain in writing why they did so.").
86. 352 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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trial court ordered payments substantially greater than the guide-
lines indicated. The court of appeals reversed and remanded on
the ground that the trial court did not make "findings" to justify
an upward departure, reasoning that the Guidelines Statute "spe-
cifically requires findings to justify an upward departure from the
guidelines when mutual consent is not present."8 7 The court of ap-
peals made no reference as to the exact nature of the required
findings. Two weeks later, however, in Mentzos v. Mentzos ,88 the
court held that the statute requires an "express finding" to sup-
port a substantial deviation above the guidelines. These court of
appeals cases set precedent: all departures require express
findings.
The Mentzos court held that by incorporating the financial
guidelines, the Child Support Statute also adopted the subdivisions
governing their use,8 9 including the requirement that courts issue
findings whenever an award deviates from the guidelines. Mentzos
was not, however, a unanimous decision. In her dissent Judge
Huspeni noted the difference between the requirements for up-
ward departures in the Guidelines Statute and those in the Child
Support Statute and concluded that the difference was not acci-
dental.90 Instead, she argued that it indicated legislative intent to
allow orders in excess of the guidelines without express findings in
non-public assistance cases; upward departures must still, of
course, reflect consideration of the relevant factors set forth in the
Child Support Statute.9 1 Standard rules of statutory construction
support Judge Huspeni's conclusion. The Child Support Statute,
which incorporated the guidelines tables for use in all cases, con-
tains requirements for downward departures, but does not refer to
upward departures. The omission indicates legislative intent to ap-
ply the requirement for upward departures only in public assist-
ance cases.
92
This construction correlates with the statute's legislative pur-
pose. The guidelines were not enacted to determine awards auto-
matically. Instead, the legislature intended to create only a "floor"
87. Id. at 821.
88. 353 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
89. Id. at 684.
90. Id. at 685.
91. Id.
92. If the legislature intended to adopt all the subdivisions of the Guidelines
Statute which apply in public assistance cases, repeating the requirements for
downward departures would have been unnecessary. If the legislature merely in-
tended to repeat the requirements in the Child Support Statute, the language
would be the same.
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or minimum support obligation for noncustodial parents.9 3 By
mandating a floor and not a ceiling concept, the legislature sought
to increase inequitably low awards, but intended that courts vary
the amount higher than the tables when individual circumstances
allowed. This mechanism was to allay a general criticism of the
guidelines concept: most tables do not lend themselves to consider-
ation of individual relevant circumstances. 94 State Senator Ron-
ald Sieloff, an attorney and member of the legislature which
enacted the guidelines, condemns use of the guidelines as a rule of
law without liberal deviation "when common sense suggests."
Such rigid application of the guidelines "defeat[s] the purpose of
the statute."9 5 As Senator Sieloff indicates, the legislature envi-
sioned courts freely ordering upward departures.
In many respects, the guidelines are not used as the legisla-
ture intended. Instead they have become the primary if not the
sole determinant of awards. When asked in a newspaper interview
how he uses the guidelines, family court referee Gerald Rutman
quipped: "I don't have to think anymore. When a guy wants to
know what his support is going to be, I just look at the chart."96 In
a more serious moment, Rutman added that he "almost always fol-
low[s] the guidelines unless the custodial parent's income is so
large that the guidelines payment appears to be unfair to the non-
custodial parent."97 Rutman reasoned that the guidelines were
fair and a means of speeding up the determination of support pro-
cess. Such an approach directly conflicts with the legislature's ex-
press intent that the guidelines fix the minimum amount of
support awarded in most cases rather than the maximum.98 Pres-
ent use of the guidelines confirms the fear expressed by the Fam-
ily Law Section Council of the Illinois State Bar. The council
reluctantly endorsed limited use of support schedules, reasoning
that "[d]espite repeated emphasis [to the contrary], . . . the judici-
ary have misapprehended the weight of support schedules, raising
them to de facto presumption status."99
The court of appeals opinions in Johnson and Mentzos rein-
93. Telephone interviews with Linda Berglin, Minnesota state senator (Oct. 29,
1984), and Ronald Sieloff, Minnesota state senator (Nov. 21, 1984).
94. Sieloff, supra note 93. See also Livingston, supra note 85, at A4 (quoting
Martin Swaden, chairman of the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Ass'n).
95. Ronald Sieloff, Child Support Guidelines: The Statute and its Problems, 2
Minn. Fain. L.J. 17, 22 (1984).
96. Livingston, supra note 85, at Al.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 81.
99. Kenneth Levin, The Use (and Abuse) of Child Support Schedules in Illinois,
71 Ill. B.J. 314, 314 (1983).
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force this rigid perception of guidelines calculations. These opin-
ions imply that awards above the guidelines are somehow suspect
because they require express findings. By requiring over-justifica-
tion of clearly fair increases, the court implies a presumption
against increases in general. The opinions in both cases presented
more than ample evidence to explain why the lower court pre-
scribed support awards above the guidelines. In Johnson,100
although the father's current net income was equal to the
mother's, he was a trainee, and therefore, his projected income
would sharply increase. In Mentzos, the father was a voluntarily
unemployed musician-the lower court awarded support to en-
courage him to either work to support his children or lose the lien
equity in the homestead also awarded through the decree.lO'
A recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision provides assur-
ance that judicial review will enforce the "floor" principle and re-
affirms the need to consider the Child Support Statute instead of
referring only to the guidelines tables when setting awards. In
Kowalzek v. Kowalzek ,102 the lower court ordered the father to
pay $150 child support per month, an amount sharply below the
guidelines amount of $352. The court arrived at this figure by
computing the amount the working mother would have paid under
the guidelines if the father had been awarded custody. The court
subtracted that amount from the father's guidelines support obli-
gation and then awarded the mother the difference.1 0 3 Appar-
ently, the computation resulted from the court's misconception
that the guidelines tables provided the entire amount necessary to
support the child instead of the amount of the father's contribu-
tion toward support. The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
It directed the lower court to consider the other four subdivisions
of the Child Support Statute in conjunction with the custodial par-
ent's income. The court criticized mechanical guidelines calcula-
tions because they ignore the five relevant factors of the Child
Support Statute.o4 It noted that the Guidelines Statute limits ju-
dicial discretion to set child support awards below the guidelines
without express findings of fact.
The Kowalzek decision is an important reminder that the
Child Support Statute remains in force and requires courts to set
awards only after consideration of specific relevant factors set out
in the statute. Thus, awards determined by referring only to the
100. 352 N.W.2d at 820.
101. 353 N.W.2d at 684.
102. 360 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
103. Id. at 425-26.
104. Id. at 426.
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guidelines violate the Child Support Statute. The tables consider
only the net income of the obligor and the number of children and
ignore other important statutory factors such as: 1) the child's fi-
nancial resources and needs, physical and emotional condition, and
educational needs;x05 and 2) the financial needs and resources of
the custodial parent and the standard of living the child had previ-
ously enjoyed.106 Although some advocates maintain that the
guidelines consider these factors inferentially, the guidelines tables
do not allow significant differences in need or resources to affect
the amount of the award. For example, guidelines awards do not
distinguish between children who need private school tuition and
those who do not.
Like Referee Rutman,10 7 many accept the premise that the
guidelines provide a fair and reasonable support amount in most
cases. Nothing could be further from the truth. Awards based
principally or solely on the tables assure neither equity as mea-
sured by any of the traditional formulas nor amounts consistent
with the principles which justify child support. The tables do not
fulfill the objective of requiring absent parents to support their
children in order to keep them out of poverty and off welfare. At
the highest income levels the monthly support awards are less
than federal needs standards.108
The guidelines also do not assure that the child will retain
the standard of living she would have enjoyed had her parents'
marriage continued. In fact, guidelines awards make it highly
likely that the standard will substantially decline. At best, the
guidelines assure only that public assistance will bring the house-
hold income up to AFDC minimums. Under usual circumstances,
the mother's income will be grossly insufficient and the mother/
child household standard of living will suffer accordingly.
The Minnesota Guidelines do not achieve a resource-sharing
goal because they do not adequately consider the father's income
over a certain amount or the mother's income. The tables exclude
the mother's income as a factor in computing the award. This
practice ignores contemporary reality: the mother's income is not
only relevant, it is essential to the court's decision in many
105. Minn. Stat. § 518.17(4)(a), (d) (1984).
106. Id. § 518.17(4)(b), (c).
107. See Livingston, supra note 85 and accompanying text.
108. A mother with one child on public assistance receives $412 per month in the
form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). At the bottom of the
highest bracket, a noncustodial parent with $1,001/month net income pays $250.25/
month support for one child. Unless the custodial parent has income of at least




cases.109 Instead of varying the father's responsibility to accommo-
date the mother's responsibilities, the guidelines assign a fixed
share of responsibility for support to the mother or public assist-
ance. This attempt at resource sharing is arbitrary, inefficient, and
inequitable from its inception. If the mother has nothing or not
enough to furnish the remainder of support, public assistance as-
sumes the burden-unnecessarily in cases where the obligor's abil-
ity to pay exceeds the table percentage." i 0 Not considering the
mother's income risks over-burdening a father with support obliga-
tions when both parents are chargeable with that duty."' A true
resource-sharing approach considers the relative resources of both
parents in assigning appropriate obligations.
Guidelines standards also fail to meet the goals of a cost-shar-
ing formula. As discussed in the previous section, in order for the
cost sharing method to achieve equity, the court must ascertain the
"cost" of raising the child.1l2 AFDC minimums are of questiona-
ble validity even for those children wholly supported by the
state."i3 They are assuredly invalid for determining parental sup-
port obligations.
The tables do not consider the parents' contribution of child-
care services. Assignment of childcare responsibilities is an aspect
of gender. Society does not automatically associate a father with
the caretaker role, and it does not consider him a deserter if he
fails to fight (or even ask) for custody."i 4 Men with custody are
usually in that position by choice. Women, however, are "condi-
tioned" to be caretakers. Mothers are therefore often obligated to
take custody by default and to assume both the physical duty of
daily care and the expense of childcare if they work. Unless the
award is carefully structured, mothers receive no compensation.
Some costs of childcare are not recognized in awards because
they are hidden. For instance, a mother suffers financial loss
when she stays home with her sick child. Other costs, though visi-
ble, are also not reflected in the amount of the father's obligation.
A large percentage of awards do not even cover out-of-pocket ex-
penses for childcare while the mother works.liS This situation un-
fairly harms both mother and child. Childcare expense is a
109. Hunter, supra note 16, at 27.
110. Jones, supra note 9, at 26.
111. Yee, supra note 15, at 26.
112. Bergmann, supra note 49, at 115.
113. Id.
114. David Chambers, Child Support in the Twenty-First Century, in The Paren-
tal Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 283, 289.
115. A 1978 Current Population Survey states the average amount of child sup-
port received for one child was $1,288 per year. Sorenson & MacDonald, supra note
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fundamental cost of raising a child and therefore courts must con-
sider it in all awards. The most equitable formula includes out-of-
pocket childcare expenses in the total support cost that courts allo-
cate between the parents. 116
Guidelines awards also inadequately reflect childrearing costs
when an order covers two or more children. In such a case the
award does not treat each child equally or uniformly. Although
the order customarily divides the total award equally between chil-
dren, in families with more than one child, the second child raises
the total award no more than five percent. Fathers with monthly
incomes over $1,000 pay $250 for one child and only an additional
$50 for the second child.1 17 This amount is insufficient to pay
more than the additional babysitting expense for younger children
or school lunch tickets for an older child. Moreover, the children
may suffer if one child is no longer eligible for support, as when
custody of that child is changed to the father. Some orders indi-
cate a reduction by that child's share in the total amount rather
than a reversion to the guidelines. Thus, the remaining children
receive less than the guidelines amount. In these respects, the
guidelines are not an equitable method of determining support.
Awards rarely acknowledge the relationship between eco-
nomic inequities and the socially detrimental effects of divorce on
children. While financially adequate awards do not completely
free children from adjustment difficulties resulting from the sepa-
ration of divorce, adequate awards can make adjustment easier."18
Studies show that "children can deal with one stressor, but cumu-
lative or chronic stress can have a negative impact on adjust-
ment."119 Sharply reducing the income of the child's household
subjects the child to two stressors; the child must cope with the
loss of familiar neighborhood, school, and friends, and at the same
11, at 43. Computing childcare expense at 75 cents/hour (conservativ: 1978 rates)
totals $1,500 annual childcare expense.
116. Courts should calculate the parents' relative ability to pay by ascertaining
the income of each parent and then subtracting an amount for self-support to ar-
rive at each parent's disposable income. The total cost of child-raising would then
be prorated between the parents according to the ratio which each parent's disposa-
ble income bears to the total disposable income of both parents. Bruch, supra note
59, at 124-25.
117. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1984).
118. Martha Cox, Economic Support of Children by Fathers Following Divorce:
Some Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, in The Parental Child-Support
Obligation, supra note 1, at 157, 159-68. See also data cited from a new report, "The
State of Families," issued by Family Service American, a non-profit organization of
280 social service agencies. Collins, supra note 60.
119. Cox, supra note 118, at 168.
[Vol. 3:343
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
time, adjust to father's absence.120 Children also suffer when fi-
nancial strain is a source of depression and anxiety for their
mother. When she is under financial pressure, her ability to deal
with her children decreases, jeopardizing her relationship with
them.
Awards based on the guidelines alone do not consider that de-
pression and distress in children of divorced parents are as much
associated with economic decline as with actual level of income.
Such awards risk burdening children with adjustment difficulties
as well as obvious material deprivation. Therefore, courts must
consider the need to maintain the children's pre-dissolution stan-
dard of living if their awards are to be in the children's best
interests.
2. Advantages of the guidelines.
The guidelines have some positive aspects. They provide a
minimum standard for awards, statewide consistency, judicial
economy, and predictability. The guidelines insure that courts will
require fathers to pay some support. Prior to enactment of the
guidelines, judicial discretion often permitted courts to refuse to
award any support at all. Under the guidelines, noncustodial par-
ents must overcome a presumption that the minimum percentage
applies. The burden of proof rests on the father when he attempts
to lower his support obligation below the guidelines. This benefit
is particularly significant in public assistance or other cases where
the father has a low net income.121 Opposing universal application
of the tables is not opposition to the "floor" concept, which is vital
to poor women; rather, it is opposing the guidelines' failure to bur-
den middle and upper class fathers proportionately.
The practical advantage of consistency in awards is that it fos-
ters respect for the system. Fathers, recognizing the consistency,
will comply with support orders. Because the Guidelines Statute
applies throughout Minnesota, it is reasonable to assume that
awards are more consistent statewide than awards made using the
judicial discretion method.122 Any real comparison, however, is
impossible. No central reporting office exists to generate statistics
concerning awards.123 It is also impossible to determine whether
consistency in awards contributes to voluntary compliance. Recent
120. Id. at 164-65.
121. Levin, supra note 99, at 315.
122. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
123. Berglin, supra note 93.
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changes in enforcement methods would seem to have a more im-
mediate impact on payment.
Efficiency is a frequently cited attribute of the guidelines.
Judicial economy results because officials need only two items of
data to make the computation: the obligor's net income and the
number of children. This procedure is a timesaver. Moreover, par-
ties who assume that the tables provide a concrete, fair amount are
less likely to appeal. Attorneys are spared the often dreaded task
of negotiating the amount of support. Despite arguments based on
judicial efficiency, it is not clear that the judiciary approves of the
change. In fact, State Senator Sieloff reported that the judiciary's
response to the guidelines was generally negative. He deemed this
response "justifiable" in part, but also characterized it as a reaction
based on the unavoidable conflict between equal branches of gov-
ernment.124 Interestingly, Sieloff notes that those judges most in
favor of the guidelines are also more willing to depart from
them. 25 These courts are willing to accept the minimal limitation
on judicial discretion that the legislature intended. For them the
guidelines serve only as a threshold for the actual award, which is.
determined after judicial consideration of all relevant factors in
the Child Support Statute.
Another much-touted advantage of guidelines is their
predictabilty. But predictability is only advantageous if the pre-
dicted amount is fair and adequate. The guidelines assure neither.
Any advantage of predictability lies primarily with the obligor, and
deprives children of their right to adequate support from an absent
parent without affording them a full hearing to consider what con-
stitutes a fair amount. The need for fairness requires considera-
tion of all factors of the Child Support Statute and diminishes the
value of predictability alone.
A common criticism of the guidelines is that they set support
too high.126 At the lower end of the scale, an obligor with $500/
month income would pay $70/month support for one child, and
proponents of fathers' interests argue that the remaining $430 is
insufficient for the obligor to live on.127 These proponents fail to
consider that this amount is more than the $412 public assistance
allowance for a mother and one child. It is also more than the
$400 intermediate budget for a single person estimated by current
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.128 As long as such a dis-
124. Sieloff, supra note 95, at 21.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id.
128. Jones, supra note 9, at 25.
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parity exists between actual support costs and the amount the fa-
ther contributes, he should make certain compromises and
sacrifices to accommodate a fair support contribution.129
One Minnesota lawyer warns that a dangerous "side effect"
of the guidelines is their tendency to produce lower support orders
than previous law. He cited the pervasive "climate of uniformity"
which "create[s] a reluctance to make upward departures even
where the financial circumstances might warrant."130 The warn-
ing rings true. Judicial reluctance to make appropriate upward de-
partures risks depriving children of parental support the statute is
designed to provide and therefore outweighs any advantages of the
guidelines.
3. 1984 revisions.
The 1984 legislature revised two details of the Guidelines
Statute. Both changes appear regressive. First, the legislature
limited the amount of the obligor's monthly income subject to the
table. The previous table subjected all the obligor's net monthly
income to the calculation-the revised table limits the calculation
to the first $6,000.131 The apparent reason for this change was an
assumption that awards computed on incomes above $6,000 are per
se excessive. Application of the limit under certain circumstances,
however, shows that such an assumption is false. Calculating the
amount for a second child at that level results in only $300
monthly support-barely sufficient to provide full-time day care.
The second change allows the court, when determining
whether it should follow the guidelines, to consider debts which
the obligor owes to private creditors and incurred either for sup-
port of the child or the obligee or the generation of income. 132
Under prior law the court could not consider any of the obligor's
debts to private creditors1 33 because "child support payments take
precedence over personal investment or luxury purchases."134 Al-
lowing consideration of debts incurred for support of the child or
obligee or for the generation of income may have just the opposite
effect. Such consideration provides an incentive for fathers to
129. Id.
130. Stephen Baird, A Critical View of the 1983 Child Support Guidelines, 2
Minn. Farn. L.J. 27, 29-30 (1984).
131. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5) (1984).
132. Id. § 518.551(5)(b).
133. Minn. Stat. § 518.551(5)(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983), amended by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.551(5)(b) (1984). A court of appeals decision held that the pre-1984 Guidelines
Statute expressly forbade consideration of debts owed to private creditors in estab-
lishing child support. Bakke v. Bakke, 351 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
134. Bakke v. Bakke, 351 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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leave those debts unpaid and to spend available cash for personal
items during the interim between the end of the marital relation-
ship and the support hearing.
B. Modification of Existing Awards: COLA Adjustments
Child support awards order fathers to make payments over
an extended period of time, often for twenty years or more. Con-
tinuing awards at a fixed amount during inflationary periods de-
prives children of needed parental support. The system must
therefore accommodate adjustment for differences in purchasing
power so that the award maintains the same level of support
throughout the period.
Until 1983, the system required mothers to petition the court
for an order increasing an insufficient award. Recognizing that
modification through such a motion was an inefficient and ineffec-
tive procedure, the 1983 legislature provided for cost-of-living ad-
justment (COLA) of child support awards. 135 The right to biennial
adjustment of the amount of support based on the inflation rate
applies to both new support awards and orders based on motions
for enforcement or modification of previous awards. Although the
legislation improved the procedure, it is not a complete solution.
The COLA statute effectively overruled the precedential rule
that increases in child support based on escalating inflation rates
are not available. In Heaton v. Heaton ,136 the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that inflation was not in itself a basis for increasing a
support award. The Heaton court applied the "change of circum-
stances test" and concluded that inflation affected the mother, fa-
ther, and child equally. Therefore, no reason existed to increase
the support level.I3 7 The court adopted the trial court's reasoning
that "since the incomes of the parties had increased by approxi-
mately the same percentages over the years since the divorce,
there was no substantial change in circumstances." 138 The fallacy
of that judicial observation assuredly provided impetus for statu-
tory COLA provisions in the 1983 changes. In effect, the prior rule
allocated the entire burden of inflated child support costs to the
mother. 3 9 The child certainly shared this burden if the mother
could not compensate for the inflation rate with income from
other sources.
135. Minn. Stat. § 518.641 (1984).
136. 329 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1983).
137. Id. at 555.
138. Id. at 554.
139. See, e.g., id. at 555.
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Although COLA provisions offer a more equitable solution to
this problem, their value is often illusory. A guaranteed right to
biennial adjustment accrues in each award determination. Actual
increase, however, is not guaranteed. If the court finds that the
obligor's income or occupation does not provide COLA or that an-
other step-increase has the effect of COLA, the court will waive
the requirement. The obligee may also waive the requirement in
the decree. 140
Moreover, even decrees with COLA provisions do not assure
an automatic increase. Some obligees may be unaware of the right
and duty to request biennial adjustment. 14 1 Other obligees, aware
of the right, may forgo asserting it because they feel incompetent
to file the biennial notice petitions themselves and hesitate to in-
cur legal expense to do so. The mother may also determine that
the procedure will not prove cost beneficial if the father asserts his
right to a hearing and establishes that his income does not warrant
an increase. Aside from procedural defects, the primary reason
why COLA benefits may be illusory is that increases will be insuf-
ficient if they are based on awards which are inequitably low. Un-
less the original award is fair, the inequity continues
notwithstanding adjustments for the inflation rate.
Despite these shortcomings, COLA provisions are generally
equitable. Awards must consider inflation to provide the same
level of support for the duration of the order. The COLA concept
carries out the principles of cost-sharing or resource-sharing so
long as the order is in force. Similarly, the principles of assuring
the child of either a minimum standard of living or the same stan-
dard of living she would have enjoyed if the parents had not di-
vorced demand increases in support to match inflation.
IV. Minnesota Child Support Law For The Future
Child support law in Minnesota has not achieved equity, and
the results are far-reaching. Ironically, its inequitable effects most
severely burden the child whom the system purports to protect.
Many suggestions for improving both the awards process and en-
forcement measures seek to reform the system to more adequately
provide basic support for all children.
140. Minn. Stat. § 518.641(1), (5) (1984).
141. Welfare officials, however, will file public assistance petitions for COLA
routinely, but the public coffers will retain any increases. For information explain-
ing explicit procedures for "tracking" eligible COLA cases and assuring that the
requisite notice to obligor is duly given, see Dept. of Pub. Welfare, State of MN,
1983 Legislation on Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) in Child Support Orders 83-
55 (July 29, 1983).
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Some proposed reforms require innovative and thorough
changes in the national child support system. If adopted, these
programs would go far toward guaranteeing a humane upbringing
for children who are presently without adequate support from an
absent parent. Although the proposals vary, they generally in-
clude a "floor" for support, and almost all programs also provide
for widespread public childcare services.142 One commentator pro-
poses an extension of social insurance benefits, such as those re-
ceived by children of deceased or disabled workers, to all children
who lose parental support for any reason. Under this plan, the
level of support would be based on standards determined by a
commission formed for that specific function. No benefits would
be payable when actual parental support or alternative benefits
equal or exceed the standard, but if these sources fall short, the in-
surance program would pay benefits equal to eighty percent of the
difference.143
Other suggestions resemble supplemental family income pro-
grams in Sweden and France under which the government pays a
fixed family allowance to all parents who have children.144
Although a social insurance plan of this dimension would be
costly, it would produce many benefits. Economic benefits would
include eliminating the societal costs of raising an increasing pro-
portion of succeeding generations in poverty. The emotional and
psychic benefits would be boundless. Unfortunately, today's polit-
ical climate of retrenchment dictates that broad federal social in-
surance plans do not offer a realistic solution.
Improving existing Minnesota child support laws, however, is
realistic. Of first importance is assessment of the Guidelines Stat-
ute. Cases from the court of appeals indicate that courts are not
applying the guidelines as the legislature intended.145 The
Kowalzek decision in particular demonstrates how grafting the
Guidelines Statute to the Child Support Statute has created ambi-
guity,146 requiring additional legislation to clarify its meaning. The
statute does not provide for a follow-up study (as did the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines) because funding was unavailable.147
No statewide data is available on child support awards, 148 although
142. Hunter, supra note 16, at 27.
143. Harold Watts, A Proposal for the Reform of the Child-Support System, in
The Parental Child-Support Obligation, supra note 1, at 257-61.
144. Hunter, supra note 16, at 25.
145. See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
146. 360 N.W.2d at 423.




data already gathered on 1980-81 awards in three Minnesota coun-
ties is available for comparison with awards made under the
guidelines. 49
Minnesota is using child support guidelines. Therefore it is
exempt from the requirement of the 1984 federal law.150 That law
requires states to appoint commissions to study child support stan-
dards and determine whether additional state or federal legislation
is needed. In light of the scope and importance of the issue, rely-
ing on this technicality to avoid study by a state commission would
disadvantage Minnesota's child support program. The legislature
originally designed the Minnesota guidelines to deal with the spe-
cific problems of welfare families and then extended the guide-
lines to apply to all families without a careful study. The
circumstances surrounding adoption of the guidelines particularly
indicate that further study is necessary.
Congress recognized that development of fair child support
guidelines was no easy task when it enacted the 1984 legislation.151
Conflicting congressional opinions about the guidelines approach
to setting awards resulted in a delayed effective date-states have
until October 1, 1987 to establish guidelines but enforcement meas-
ures are effective October 1, 1985.152 During this time the commis-
sions are to study carefully the concerns which prompted the
federal legislation. Concerns include unfairly low support awards
(and more rarely high ones), disparity of awards despite similar
situations, and the economic situation of custodial parents and chil-
dren contrasted with non-custodial parents.153 For all these rea-
sons, a commission would also be appropriate in Minnesota.
A commission to evaluate child support concepts offers poten-
tial benefits for children. The amount and extent of potential ben-
efits depend on keeping the commission's primary focus on the
needs of children and fashioning a child support system capable of
meeting those needs. A commission must address the conflict be-
tween complex social values which arises each time a court awards
child support. The most influential factor explaining why the
present system produces inequitable awards is its propensity to
slight the child's right to parental support in order to defer to the
149. Aldrich & Orsello, supra note 17. See also Support and Maintenance
Awards in St. Louis County, 1 Minn. Faro. L.J. 115 (1982).
150. Diane Dodson & Robert Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984: New Tools for Enforcement, 10 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 3051, 3061
(1984).
151. Id. at 3059.
152. Id. at 3055, 3059; Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.A. & 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1985)).
153. Dodson & Horowitz, supra note 150, at 3059.
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father's "due process" rights. If society is generally unwilling to
require that fathers support their children in the same manner af-
ter divorce, it must be willing to provide alternative means of fair
support for the children.
Initially, unless the legislature remedies the existing statu-
tory ambiguity of its own volition, a commission should explore re-
medial measures to insure use of the present Minnesota guidelines
as only a floor for awards. Because the AFDC childrearing costs
inherent in the guidelines are associated with minimal standards,
using the guidelines as the sole determinant of support awards le-
gitimates and rationalizes social inequality.
Establishing realistic estimates of actual child raising costs at
various income levels is the logical second consideration for a com-
mission. Courts risk ordering an inequitable support award re-
gardless of the method used to determine the award unless the
child raising cost used is accurate. Availability of valid child rais-
ing cost figures is also vitally important to enable a commission to
evaluate objectively existing and proposed standards for child sup-
port awards. Childcare is one of the most significant childrearing
costs. Therefore, it is essential to the children's welfare that a
commission contemplate a childcare system which is not wholly
dependent on the mother's earnings. A public daycare program
making daycare accessible to all families, either through govern-
ment reimbursement or sliding scale charges, is the best solution
to this critical problem. Expanded subsidies for childcare will re-
quire the united efforts of all levels of government to develop a co-
ordinated child support system.
Restructuring the COLA provisions would strengthen this
important and necessary component of the child support system.
Commission proposals that all orders provide for automatic bien-
nial adjustments and that obligors bear responsibility for giving
notice if circumstances do not warrant a particular increase would
encourage fathers to continue to contribute their proportionate
share of their children's support.
In order to conduct a thorough study, the commission must
also consider whether each facet of the child support system is
best implemented by statutory, administrative, or judicial means.
No one approach works best in every instance. For example, the
statutory approach seems most appropriate to implement uniform,
automatic procedures such as the guidelines' floor concept, COLA
provisions, and public childcare programs. On the other hand, the
judiciary appears best suited to provide case-by-case analysis re-
quired in determining the actual amount of individual awards-
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both initially and when modifying existing awards due to changed
circumstances. An administrative approach might be used most ef-
fectively to supplement the other approaches. For instance, re-
quiring officials to complete family financial statements which
become a part of the record in each child support award would fa-
cilitate review of awards. The combination resulting from using
the approach most appropriate to the procedure incorporates a se-
ries of checks and balances, an important element in any effective
governmental system.
Allocating child support costs between parents without con-
sidering the mother's income as the Minnesota guidelines do is pa-
tently arbitrary. Minnesota's Child Support Statute requires
courts to consider the mother's income when they determine how
much support the father is to pay. Thus, a commission must inves-
tigate methods for courts to carry out this statutory directive. A
formula based on the parents' relative ability to pay and apportion-
ing child support according to each parent's disposable income 154
appears to be both efficient and equitable for mother, father, and
child.
System reform must acknowledge that the state assumes a
parental role in child support decisions. Appropriate reforms,
therefore, must enable the state to act the way parents should-in
the best interest of the child.
154. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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